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Prophecies are rarely fulfilled, although this does not deter the prophets and their followers.
Throughout history, many cults have told us that the end of  the world is nigh, and they look forward
to the ensuing ‘ecstasy’. In their view, the world is a bad place and must be put out of  its misery. They
believe that they will be spared, and in preparation they live their earthly lives in accordance with
their particular interpretation of the Kingdom of God. Even when their latest prediction of the end
of the world fails to materialize, they continue to insist that they are right and that they are indeed
‘the chosen ones’.1 Prophets who unconditionally predict the end of  the world are false prophets. A
theologian might tell us that a true prophet is someone who tries to awaken mankind, to alert us to
certain risks. A true prophecy is thus not the same as a prediction.2
Can the environmentalists who predict the end of  the world due to global warming also be
regarded as false prophets? They are entirely convinced that they are right, but are they also blind to
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the facts? Since the publication of his book The
Skeptical Environmentalist in 2001, the Danish so-
ciologist Bjorn Lomborg has attracted considera-
ble international publicity. He accuses environ-
mental organizations of being selective in their
presentation of scientific data in order to support
the standpoint - or ‘litany’ as he terms it - that
the world is in terminal decline.3 One similarity
between some environmentalists and the afore-
mentioned cults is that they adhere to a very slan-
ted interpretation of the facts: all life on Earth
will come to an end and it is already far too late
to do anything about it. One difference is that
their predictions of environmental catastrophe
have a somewhat more distant horizon, whereu-
pon it will be many decades or even centuries
before all the facts are known and we can deter-
mine whether there is any sound basis to those
predictions. And then we have the false prophets
who claim that there is no such thing as climate
change caused by human activity. They too pre-
dict the end of the world as we know it, but one
brought about by draconian environmental legis-
lation. A question which has occupied me for
many years is how science can help policy to ste-
er a course between these two extremes - the alar-
mist position and that of  the denialists.
Today, there is indeed great uncertainty
about the future of  our planet. For one thing, we
still know too little about how the Earth works
as a system. We are dealing with an extremely
complex natural system, and one which we shall
probably never completely understand. This ap-
plies at all levels of scale, from the local to the
global. We are now in the anthropocene, an era in
which mankind itself has become a significant
geological factor, with human activities having a
major impact on the Earth’s ecosystems. The lar-
ge-scale changes to ‘system Earth’ can create new
opportunities as well as new risks. Both the oppor-
tunities and the risks are subject to uncertainties.
Indeed, the future is shrouded in uncertainty. Not
only do we not know how the natural systems
work, we do not know nearly enough about how
society itself works at any level of scale. Fur-
thermore, the measures proposed in response to
the risks created by system changes will themsel-
ves have uncertain effects.
In short, climate change might result in
many species becoming extinct, and in the com-
plete collapse of  human and natural systems. On
the other hand, the consequences could be rela-
tively minor. (The operative word here is ‘relati-
vely’, since there will still be a dramatic local
impact in some places, and of course disastrous
consequences for the lost species.) Similarly, the
measures and new technologies which are now
seen as promising ways to mitigate the damage
may indeed be real breakthroughs, but they could
all come to nothing. How should society and the
individual actors address the many uncertainti-
es? What approaches are available to them? Wi-
thin the limited time at my disposal today, I shall
try to explain how such questions can be made
the subject of  formal research.
My research revolves around a broad inter-
pretation of ‘uncertainty’, in which there is also
a place for ambiguity and the complexity of ob-
jectives. It allows for various world views and
values. But there remains one key, overarching
question: how, in the face of  all the many uncer-
tainties, can system Earth be managed in a res-
ponsible manner? More specifically, how can sci-
entists form good prospects of  the future - while
telling like it is - without being condemned as
false prophets? I address such questions in the
context of ‘the good life’: a philosophical con-
cept which can be summarized as a pleasant and
responsible existence for everyone, retaining
everything good that our planet has to offer for
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the benefit of  both today’s society and future
generations.4
The precautionary culture
In the past, people took a very different
approach to uncertainty and risk.5 In early mo-
dern society, those who suffered harm (in the sen-
se of  injury, loss or damage) were not seen as
‘victims’ to be helped or compensated. They and
they alone had to bear the consequences: a case
of  ‘every man for himself ’. Any misfortune, such
as an accident in the workplace, was attributed
to fate. The nineteenth century saw a shift from
the ‘blame culture’ to a ‘risk culture’, in which
loss or injury was seen more as an inevitable sys-
tem effect rather than the avoidable consequen-
ce of  individual actions or omissions. From the
viewpoint of  costs versus benefits, people would
simply accept the risks, while collective arrange-
ments - insurance - provided compensation for
any loss or injury incurred. It was in the 1970s
that the ‘precautionary’ culture began to emerge.
Roel Pieterman, who specializes in the so-
ciology of  law, explains the precautionary cultu-
re as the result of five societal learning proces-
ses, together with a radicalization of the risk cul-
ture.6 The first such learning process was the de-
velopment of the welfare state, which taught
everyone that an increasing number of different
types of  ‘harm’ would be compensated, and com-
pensated more fully. Second, many of  the exis-
ting threats to health and wellbeing had now been
removed. Third, people were encouraged to be-
lieve that the prevention of loss or damage was
not their own direct personal responsibility. Four-
th, it was realized that many risks and threats go
beyond the individual’s direct personal experien-
ce or sphere of influence. And fifth, there was
far greater scepticism with regard to the authori-
ty of government. I would like to add a sixth pro-
cess to this list: a shift from an emphasis on soli-
darity to an emphasis on self-interest.
The combination of these factors led to a
call for all risks to be eradicated. Alongside the
risks created by climate change further to human
activity, Pieterman discusses - at the same level
- the risks of low-frequency radiation from mo-
bile telephone networks, the risks of drilling for
gas under the Wadden Sea, and the risks of  vac-
cinating children. Mobile network operators
wishing to erect new antennas still face signifi-
cant public opposition, even though experts sta-
te that the risks are negligible or non-existent.
Permits to extract gas from under the Wadden
Sea have been withheld on numerous occasions.
There is a significant body of research to con-
firm that the risks (predominantly the risk of
subsidence) are minimal. Nevertheless, permit
procedures were delayed due to the uncertainty
that remained. And while there is worldwide con-
sensus that the health gains of vaccination far
outweigh the risks, there are still parents who
refuse to have their children vaccinated, citing
hypothetical damage to the immune system, the
development of  ultra-resistant virus strains or the
extremely small risk - less than one in a million -
of a fatal reaction.
A precautionary climate policy?
In my view, it is not appropriate to place
the risks of climate change due to human activi-
ty on the same level as these technological risks.
The cited examples are all small risks, although
exactly how small is itself uncertain. There is
evidence to suggest that the global climate has
changed significantly over the past century. It is
‘very likely’, by which I mean that there is a gre-
ater than 90% probability, that the average glo-
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bal surface temperature rose by between 0.6° and
0.9°C during this period.7 If we look at even lon-
ger timescales, we see evidence of significant
warming. The past fifty years have ‘likely’ (grea-
ter than 66% probability) been the warmest peri-
od in the northern hemisphere for the past 1,300
years.8 The past one hundred years have seen a
significant increase in rainfall in the eastern parts
of North and South America, northern Europe
and North and Central Asia. There have been
equally significant droughts in the Sahel region,
the Mediterranean region, southern Africa and
parts of South Asia.9 In most land regions, perio-
ds of heavy rainfall have become more frequent.10
Let us remember that the variability of weather
conditions is also part of the concept of ‘clima-
te’.
Of  course, such statements about observed
climate changes say nothing about the causes of
those changes. Nevertheless, the vast majority of
climate scientists believe that there is a link with
the ‘greenhouse effect’ which is enhanced by hu-
man activity. The link has even been quantified.
It is ‘very likely’ that at least half  of  the warming
seen during the past fifty years is attributable to
man’s emissions of  greenhouse gases.11
Given all the changes observed, and given
the fact that at least some can be attributed to
the greenhouse effect of  human activity, it is not
unreasonable to assume that even greater chan-
ges are in store. Some of the future changes to
our climate system are already inevitable, having
been caused by past emissions. Even if  global
emissions of greenhouse gases are vastly redu-
ced in the very near future, these changes will
still occur. Take, for example, the rising sea le-
vels. During the course of  the twentieth century,
the average sea level worldwide rose by between
12 and 22 cm. It is very likely that this was due in
part to expansion caused by higher water tempe-
ratures.12 Moreover, it seems probable that sea
levels will continue to rise for hundreds, perhaps
even thousands of years, whereupon the overall
increase will be in the order of  several metres. It
will, after all, take hundreds or thousands of ye-
ars before the temperature of all oceans rises by
an equal amount.
But even in the somewhat shorter term -
within the next one hundred years, we are likely
to see some dramatic and unavoidable effects of
climate change. It is perfectly conceivable that
the small island states (such as the Maldives) will
face ever more frequent and ever more destructi-
ve flooding. The same applies to the low-lying
coastal zones of the continental land masses -
regions in which hundreds of millions of people
now live. Bangladesh is one example. There mi-
ght also be changes in the patterns of precipitati-
on, while the higher temperatures will place con-
siderable strain on various ecosystems. Some of
those ecosystems may not survive, whereupon
many species of flora and fauna face extinction.
We are already in a desperate situation. No mat-
ter what we do, we are powerless to halt some
climate changes, and hence unable to preclude
the problems they will cause. In the interests of
balance, I should also mention that some coun-
tries - such as Russia - will actually benefit from
climate change, provided it is not too extreme, in
that their agricultural output will increase. So, the
effects are not all negative.13
We should not attach too much value to the
precise outcomes of modelling forecasts, howe-
ver. The fundamental debate about climate chan-
ge must focus on the seemingly improbable events
which will nevertheless have major consequen-
ces should they occur. It is still too early to say
whether the ‘precautionary culture’ has provided
an effective response to the climate problem. In
terms of  climate policy, the precautionary prin-
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ciple14 offers very little assistance in making ap-
propriate decisions. Just how cautious must we
be? Must we strive to restrict global warming to
2°C? Could we permit ourselves a little more le-
eway, or is 1.5°C already too much? How much
must national governments and other actors in-
vest in the necessary measures? The precautio-
nary principle does not provide the answers to
such questions. In fact, in the context of  the cli-
mate treaties, the precautionary principle merely
allows countries to implement a policy while there
is still remaining uncertainty. It can do no more.
To put it another way, the precautionary princi-
ple encourages us to insure against the possible
collapse of system Earth, but does not allow us
to calculate the maximum permissible ‘premium’.
This is a source of great concern to many econo-
mists.
Cost-benefit analysis
What role could cost-benefit analysis play
in evaluating measures designed to optimize
opportunities and restrict the risks to man and
nature in the face of a possible collapse of sys-
tem Earth? Let us first consider how Lomborg
suggests we should proceed. He proposes esta-
blishing different spending priorities for the re-
sources we now devote to international develop-
ment. Lomborg assembled a group of eight lea-
ding economists (including three Nobel laurea-
tes) in Copenhagen to prioritize proposals for
ways in which to tackle various world problems,
ranging from the HIV/Aids pandemic to the Kyo-
to Protocol and taxes on carbon emissions. The
experts were asked to assume that governments
had a ‘spare’ fifty billion dollars at their disposal.
In this group’s ranking of  the ten most pressing
global problems, climate change finished in ten-
th place.15 For the past few years, Lomborg has
been the director of the Copenhagen Consensus
Center, part of the Copenhagen Business Scho-
ol, where he has repeated this process.
The critical question which we can ask Lom-
borg and his colleagues is whether the standard
cost-benefit analysis is really able to establish such
a ranking. Can it do so in a manner which is poli-
tically acceptable and which adequately addres-
ses the very long timescales of system Earth, as
well as the requirement for continuity or ‘sustai-
nability’? Where sustainability relates to the allo-
cation of relatively scarce natural resources, the-
re is of  course an economic aspect at play. In any
analysis of sustainability issues, it is therefore
useful to draw upon formal welfare theory.16 That
theory is concerned with subjective economic
goals which are defined more broadly than the
objective economic goals (wealth in terms of  the
possession of economic assets) or financial eco-
nomic goals (wealth in terms of  money). Given
that the pursuit of one goal will often stand in
the way of achieving the other, concessions and
compromises must be made at both the individu-
al and societal level.17 To use the formal term,
there will be ‘trade-offs’.
Many uncertainties attach to the use of cost-
benefit analyses at the level of system Earth.18
Applying the standard economic discount rate
does not allow us to compare the future effects
on welfare with the immediate effects. And when
evaluating measures, should we be concerned
solely with the overall returns or should we also
take the fair distribution of the welfare effects
into account? What factors should determine the
discount rate itself ? What valuation methods
should be used? Can the chosen method address
the negative valuation of possible catastrophes?
Given uncertainties such as these, the question
is whether the amount that represents the effects
of the measure on the ‘balance sheet’ is merely
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the result of  an arbitrary calculation. If  so, it is
meaningless. It is certainly useful to assess policy
proposals in terms of  their likely effectiveness,
and to take account of the priorities which glo-
bal society wishes to pursue. However, this ‘me-
ans discussion’ must not obscure the ‘goals dis-
cussion’. If the climate risks identified today are
considered unacceptable, mankind must take ac-
tion but must do so in a way which does not cre-
ate unacceptable consequences in terms of  other
world problems. Now that there is a collective
objective - to limit global warming to within two
degrees and to do so with a reasonably certain
degree of probability - it is indeed useful to apply
a cost-benefit analysis to the various proposed
solutions and to apply economic policy instru-
ments. But we should remain alert to the perver-
sities which may emerge, as in carbon emissions
trading systems which could result in additional
loss of  biodiversity.
Nuclear energy and geo-
engineering?
The discussion about the economic effici-
ency of ‘solutions’ to one of the greatest threats
to system Earth - the climate problem - is closely
linked to the discussion about technology. What
new technologies will actually materialize and
which will work? Opinions are divided. There are
those who propose a technological ‘quick fix’, and
others who regard this option as highly undesira-
ble. Among the latter group there are those who
do not wish to use technology at all, and those
who are willing to experiment, but to do so cau-
tiously, taking the uncertainty factor fully into
account.
There are many different forms of  techno-
logy which could be applied. Many environmen-
tal scientists consider it a matter of course that
we must eventually derive practically all our ener-
gy from renewable sources, such as solar and
wind power. Exactly how these energy technolo-
gies will have developed by 2050 and beyond is
unknown: this is yet another uncertainty. We can
make plans and projections based on the techno-
logies we already have, but we must also take
into account the possibility of new technologies
being developed in the meantime. Given the sca-
le and seriousness of the problem, however, the
world cannot afford the luxury of dismissing any
energy technology out of  hand. All options - in-
cluding nuclear energy and even ‘geo-enginee-
ring’- must be given due consideration. Of cour-
se, both nuclear energy and geo-engineering are
subject to a number of caveats and misgivings
which will do much to inform the societal debate
in the years to come. My decision to devote at-
tention to nuclear energy and geo-engineering
today could, I suppose, be interpreted as a call to
consider these options in preference to solar and
wind energy. That is a risk I shall have to take,
but it is really not my intention. In fact, I think
we may be expecting rather too much of nuclear
energy and geo-engineering.
Nuclear energy does indeed serve to redu-
ce carbon emissions and, according to many ex-
perts, is economically attractive even when all
the social costs and other negative aspects are
taken into consideration. Nevertheless, invest-
ment in nuclear energy is currently at a very low
level, with many projects having been abando-
ned or put on hold following the Fukushima di-
saster. Current uranium stocks will certainly last
the rest of the 21st century without the nuclear
industry having to resort to enrichment or re-
cycling. But even with a major upscaling of  cur-
rent nuclear energy facilities, this option would
eventually be able to provide only some ten per
cent of  the global energy requirement. Nuclear
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energy can therefore never be regarded as the sole
answer to climate change. Moreover, some ma-
jor disadvantages attach to the use of nuclear
energy and to any upscaling. Apart from the pro-
blem of  disposing of  nuclear waste safely, which
has still not been solved, the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons must be a major concern. It seems
that our world is unable to observe the doctrine
of  the non-proliferation treaties. There are seve-
ral countries which have used the development
of  nuclear energy as a stepping stone to that of
nuclear weapons. And if  Fukushima has taught
us anything, it is that there are always aspects
that not even the most diligent safety planner
could have foreseen. Being well prepared means
remaining open to surprises - a point to which I
shall return below.19
Geo-engineering comes in many shapes and
sizes. One proposal is to launch gigantic mirrors
into space to deflect the sun’s rays. This is not a
particularly practical idea. Other suggestions in-
clude injecting a fine mist of sulphate particles
into the stratosphere, or ‘seeding’ seawater to
promote evaporation and the formation of  cloud
cover - both somewhat more realistic. Even plan-
ting new forests can be seen as a form of  geo-
engineering, the intention being that the trees will
absorb carbon from the atmosphere. The geo-
engineering methods which deflect sunlight are
being touted as a form of  ‘emergency cooling’
for our planet. People used to be concerned that
too much attention was being devoted to redu-
cing greenhouse emissions and to climate adap-
tation. Today, they are concerned that the tech-
nological geo-engineering options will merely ‘ca-
mouflage’ the effects of  the greenhouse gases.
Once again, the problem would not be tackled at
its source. Many options, such as injecting sul-
phate particles into the stratosphere, are not per-
manent solutions. Once you stop injecting the
particles, the underlying problem - increased CO2
concentration - is actually worse than it was and
the warming effect will continue even more ra-
pidly. This sort of  geo-engineering - also known
as ‘solar radiation management’ is at best a stop-
gap option to offset the worst effects of rising
temperatures, while extremely stringent emissi-
on reduction measures will have to be implemen-
ted as a structural solution for the long term. Ano-
ther objection to most geo-engineering options
is, of  course, their unknown and uncertain risks.20
Institutional questions
In all discussions about solutions to the cli-
mate problem, whether in the economic sphere
(carbon pricing and trading) or the technologi-
cal, it is essential to remain realistic about which
measures should be implemented at which level.
Moreover, it must be asked whether the global
community is actually capable of making agree-
ments which will limit the temperature increase
to below two degrees, given the enormous eco-
nomic interests which attach to CO2 emissions
and their reduction. The international negotiati-
ons thus far give little cause for optimism. Ac-
cording to David Victor, professor of Internati-
onal Relations at UC San Diego, the architecture
of the UN negotiation process is not fit for pur-
pose. There are too many countries at the table
and too many topics on the agenda.21 He sugges-
ts that there should be a ‘carbon club’ in the
mould of the earlier world trade negotiations, in
which only those countries that really matter in
terms of  carbon emissions take part. Rather than
making agreements on reduction targets and ti-
meframes - which are actually rather meaningless
because it is extremely difficult for governments
in countries with an open economy to manage or
control emissions at all - they should make agre-
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ements regarding the actions to be taken by nati-
onal governments.22 Victor also proposes that
membership of this ‘pioneer group’ should bring
certain specific benefits so that other countries
will wish to join, and will become eligible to do
so only if they endorse ‘climate accession agree-
ments’. In this scenario, the UN will come to the
fore only at a much later stage, embracing the (by
now) extensive group of countries which have
already linked their respective emissions trading
systems, and promoting the development of a
truly global regime. That regime is then the cul-
mination of the process, not the starting point of
the negotiations. Whether Victor’s proposal is vi-
able remains to be seen. It seems unlikely that
Europe would find it acceptable. Nevertheless, it
does seem appropriate to treat the climate pro-
blem not as the exclusive domain of the United
Nations, but to leave the door open for other fo-
rums which can play a useful part in tackling it.
In any event, Victor makes specific reference to
the economic aspect of  climate policy, which does
of course play a dominant role.
Although the current formula for a reducti-
on in greenhouse gas emissions is familiar to all
concerned - a stable and adequately high carbon
price together with policy to promote energy effi-
ciency and the development of  new energy tech-
nologies with low carbon emissions - the actual
implementation of  this formula is far from easy.
Governments are unable to predict or manage
societal developments, and neither can they pre-
dict or manage technological developments. The
difficulties need come as no surprise. Even du-
ring the 1990s, the social scientists drew attenti-
on to the likely problems, as in the assessment
Human Choice and Climate Change,23 co-authored by
Steve Rayner, now a professor at Oxford Univer-
sity, following an extensive career in the United
States. This assessment presents valuable insights
into framing, institutional processes, the speed
of social change, the limitations of rational plan-
ning, interdisciplinarity, the focus on practice,
‘mainstreaming’, implementation at the regional
and local scale, resilience and the pluralistic ap-
proach to decision-making.
The very same aspects have once again
come to the fore in recent years. A good example
is the interdisciplinary project De Matrix which,
under the leadership of Dirk Sijmons, has set out
to identify cohesive action opportunities for cli-
mate and spatial policy in the Netherlands.24 The
project calls for a climate mitigation policy to be
implemented at the international level, with a
direct ‘trickle-down’ effect for companies and the
general public in all countries, whereby national
governments play no more - and no less - than a
facilitating role. In the wake of the Copenhagen
Climate Conference fiasco, Albert Cath, who re-
presents the social sciences within the project,
published an interesting article in the national
newspaper De Volkskrant, the title of  which can
be translated as ‘The ball is in the citizen’s court
after Copenhagen’.25 In the economic sphere, San-
der de Bruyn has proposed a new form of  CO2
levy on all products, operating in a similar way
to value added tax. This ‘Gross Added Carbon
Tax’ would bring the costs of  climate policy di-
rectly to the level of  the individual consumer.26
Eric Ferguson and I have called for a levy on
every oil and gas well, and on every coal mine.27
Both latter proposals serve to plug the various
loopholes which allow the unscrupulous to cir-
cumvent the current emissions trading system.
Both, I would contend, deserve further research,
to include a careful examination of the instituti-
onal aspects. In the field of  spatial policy, Bram
van de Klundert states that the attainment of
the emission reduction targets, and/or the remo-
val of carbon from the atmosphere, represents a
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challenge of  potentially mammoth proportions.
He therefore suggests that it is extremely impor-
tant to research whether it will be possible to
achieve a cultural shift in the Netherlands, repla-
cing the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) attitude
with one of  ‘Please in My Back Yard’ (PIMBY).28
How can the advantages of  sustainable energy
sources be passed on to the (local) producers of
sustainable energy? Once again, the national
government’s role should be that of  facilitator,
whereby the main effect will be achieved in the
context of  a strong international policy.
In a similar vein, Maarten Hajer, director
of the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assess-
ment Agency, has recently proposed a radical
change in the government’s management philo-
sophy.29 At present, he contends, the government
makes too little use of the creativity and learning
ability of the business community and the gene-
ral public. While there remains a clear role for
the government in promoting a broad portfolio
of technological development,30 it is now time to
involve the ‘soft’ institutional side as well. By
removing obstacles and barriers, the government
will encourage society at large to play its part in
developing new markets for the new technologi-
es.
In short, institutional questions play a very
prominent role in any response to the climate pro-
blem, which is one of the most significant issues
affecting the continuity and sustainability of the
Earth system. I am extremely proud that VU
University, and specifically Frank Biermann, have
taken such a leading role in the worldwide Earth
System Governance project, which highlights the
crucial importance of  institutional changes to the
global decision-making system. I am also extre-
mely proud that the project has asked me to co-
chair its ‘Taskforce on Methodology for Earth
System Governance Research’. One thing is al-
ready very clear to me: the current international
approach to Earth system governance is unsatis-
factory. We need new institutions and a radical
shift in how to deal with knowledge and values.
This is what I shall be working to achieve in the
years to come.
Uncertainty, complexity and guiding
principles
What makes the responsible governance of
the Earth as a system so very difficult? I would
like to offer a very brief account of the comple-
xity and uncertainty which characterize the pro-
blems involved. Nature and mankind - the world
itself  - are extremely ambiguous. Looking for the
essence of  nature, of  man or of  the world is a frui-
tless task.31 We term a situation or idea ‘ambi-
guous’ if it can be viewed from two or more fra-
mes of reference, each of which is consistent in
itself  but incompatible with the others. In the tra-
ditional scientific approach, the participative
mode must be suppressed, and we must act as if
everything is external, objective and immutable.
One of the most basic aspects of the state of
humanity - of being a person - is that our cons-
cious selves can work in one of two different
modes at any one time: that of actor or that of
observer. The alternative, propounded as a new
scientific approach by the mathematician Willi-
am Byers, among others, is to allow yourself to
be aware of the ambiguity of situations, and to
translate that ambiguity into creativity.
Examples of ambiguity within mathematics
include the polarities of quality and quantity in
whole numbers, and the complex world of real
numbers, which can be treated as both discrete
and continuous.32 The French philosopher, soci-
ologist and ‘complexity thinker’ Edgar Morin de-
veloped a system theory based on evolutionary
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biology. Here, too, there is an irreconcilable am-
biguity between subject and object.33 Human
behaviour can often be modelled - to a certain
extent - based on the options available within the
existing structures, but there always remains a
grey area in the form of  unpredictability and sur-
prises. We thus see reflexivity, whereby the relati-
onship between the options and structures is not
stable.
In his book Ignorance and Surprise, the Ger-
man environmental sociologist Matthias Gross
offers an overview of  sociological theories whi-
ch have given rise to social experiments and sur-
prises.34 Gross concludes that much of  the cur-
rent sociological theory relating to our knowled-
ge society is based on deep uncertainty and the
inevitability of  surprises. He cites the regenerati-
on of the open-pit brown coal mines south of
Leipzig to become an attractive lakeland area as
an example of  a social experiment. Very little was
known about how to go about transforming the-
se deep pits, from which all water had been assi-
duously pumped out in the past, into lakes of
ecological value. However, because all actors
were determined to bring about the transforma-
tion, they were prepared to allow for surprises
and to adapt their plans and methods accordin-
gly without too many institutional problems. They
were able to learn ‘on the fly’.
In such an unpredictable, complex world,
how can we hope to achieve the ‘good prospects’
of my title? Let me first call upon one of the gre-
atest thinkers of our age, Amartya Sen. At the
beginning of  his book The Idea of  Justice, Sen pro-
poses a theory of justice which can and, he con-
tends, must be applied in practice. It is one which
offers the opportunity to determine how injusti-
ce can be reduced in order to promote justice.35
He therefore opts not to present the largely irre-
levant characteristics of the perfect and perfec-
tly just society, upon which so much political phi-
losophy is based. To arrive at a responsible go-
vernance system for the Earth itself, we must ar-
rive at a theory which defines justice in the sense
of a ‘good life in partnership with the Earth’. That
theory must establish the factors which will pro-
mote such a just relationship and those which
would undermine it, without presenting any ide-
alistic, Utopian picture. In short, it must be a prag-
matic theory. Such a theory will not seek optimi-
zation, but will identify the worse case scenarios
and strive to mitigate their effects should they
indeed emerge.
Next, I turn to the aforementioned Edgar
Morin, who in the 1990s applied his thinking on
complexity to the global environment problem
and its implications in terms of  the responsibili-
ties of mankind in the anthropocene era.36 Morin
concluded that man’s task is to continue the pro-
cess of civilizing the Earth. Amid the hopeless-
ness of  late-modern society, which incorporates
both problem and solution, we must encourage
the evolution of modernity through a process of
experimentation. Morin formulated six basic prin-
ciples for this task, here shortened to aphorisms:
1. Life builds up hope that builds up life.
2. All the great transformations or creations
have been unthinkable until they actually
came to pass.
3. All the happy events of history have
always been a priori improbable.
4. First, dig underground and transform the
substratum before anything is changed on
the surface.
5. Where danger threatens, that which sa-
ves from it also grows.
6. We can become even more human.
There is no guaranteed ‘happy ending’ here,
but at least there are reasonably good prospects.
After all, we are only just at the very beginning
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of the anthropocene. But even in the worse case
scenario, I believe that the observance of  the fo-
llowing guiding principles, inspired by Morin’s
aphorisms, will enable us to make use of new
technology in our governance of  the Earth sys-
tem:
1. Do not be a false prophet, but continue
to hope that man and nature will continue
to live on Earth. Working to develop new
technology will offer hope.
2. Allow for the possibility of new techno-
logical breakthroughs and behaviour which
could not have been foreseen.
3. Do not stake everything on technologi-
cal developments which experts consider
feasible at a given moment. They may not
materialize.
4. Allow new technology to prove itself  gra-
dually by means of small-scale local experi-
ments. If  and when critical mass is achie-
ved, the technology can then be incorpora-
ted into the system as a whole.
5. Be alert to the risks of  new technology:
its use can both exacerbate and mitigate pro-
blems.
6. Learn from one’s mistakes in order to be
able to use new technology more effective-
ly.
These are, of course, just examples of the
possible guiding principles. In the years ahead, I
shall attempt to formulate yet more based on
empirical research. I shall study social experiments
in which one learns how to cope more effectively
with uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity. I shall
also examine various value systems, the effect of
institutional conditions, and the way in which
scientists and policy-makers regard their own ro-
les. In all this, my frame of  reference will be that
of philosophical pragmatism. My heuristics will
be the experiment: what constitutes a good soci-
al experiment? My metaphor will be Morin’s ana-
logy of  digging down into the substrata. My com-
pass will be the ethics of ‘the good life’. In all my
research, I shall apply a practical ‘down to earth’
approach in examining the various aspects of the
development of new technologies: safer nuclear
generators, geo-engineering and renewable ener-
gy, to cite just three examples. Once again, I wish
to stress that effective solutions to the problems
which jeopardize the future of the Earth system
will rely on the existing methods, such as carbon
pricing, just as much as on any new technology.
New approaches must not represent a technolo-
gy push: there must be a technology pull.
The role of scientists
Given all the uncertainties which surround
the future of the Earth system, what role can and
should scientists play in the societal debate about
its governance? The perceptions of risks such as
climate change are ambiguous and vary between
countries, cultures and communities. Even sci-
entists hold varying perceptions of the risks, al-
though they do not always make those percepti-
ons explicit. When a scientist is called upon to
advise the government or to take part in the pu-
blic debate, he bears a great responsibility to per-
form the task well. To explain this point further,
it is useful to consider the various roles which
scientists can play in relation to the decision-
makers.
In his book The Honest Broker (2007), Roger
Pielke identifies four possible roles. The first is
that of ‘pure scientist’. In this role, the scientist
is not interested in the practical implications of
his or her research, but is merely searching for
‘the truth’. The second role is that of  ‘science
arbiter’, in which the scientist will confine him-
self to advising on those issues which can be in-
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controvertibly resolved by science: there are ri-
ght answers and wrong answers. The third role is
that of ‘issue advocate’. Here, the scientist at-
tempts to promote a particular interest by virtue
of his status as an expert, while not revealing his
own values or preferences. Finally, there is the
‘honest broker of policy alternatives’. This role
comes to the fore when the problems under con-
sideration are too complex and too politically
polarized to permit any straightforward, hard-and-
fast scientific advice to be given.
In today’s climate debate, we can see scien-
tists playing each of  these four roles. Given the
complexity and conflicting interests inherent in
climate policy, it is the ‘honest broker’ who can
claim to address the facts most effectively, doing
so with due regard for the values involved. But is
it possible to fulfil this role with complete effec-
tiveness? In the media, we regularly encounter
issue advocates at the two extremes - those for
climate measures and those against - who base
arguments on their own slanted interpretation of
the uncertainties. One is absolutely convinced
that doom and disaster await, the other is equally
convinced that there is nothing to worry about.
Each takes a very different approach to the un-
derlying scientific knowledge. Within their own
groups, there is after all a significant degree of
selectivity when it comes to the facts which mat-
ter. It is not possible to offer any straightforward
recipe whereby we can resolve the deadlock. It is
certainly inappropriate to return to a hard divisi-
on between facts and values.
In 2009 and 2010, the sceptics used the
media to engineer ‘Climategate’. Based on emails
and other documents obtained by hacking the
computers of  the University of  East Anglia’s Cli-
mate Research Unit, they claimed that the data
on global temperatures hundreds or thousands of
years ago had been falsified. The advocates of
climate policy refuted the allegations. Ultimate-
ly, this discussion is about the functioning of  the
scientific community, and especially the role of
peer review, when a research programme invol-
ves such significant societal interests. Once it is
realized, as Latour and Woolgar reminded us over
thirty years ago, that all science is conducted by
people, who may be expected to have the typical
human failings, and that many ‘facts’ are actually
historical constructs, the accusations of  ‘foul
play’ will quickly follow.37 And yet, there are epis-
temic and non-epistemic values at play in all sci-
entific practices. Together, those values create a
subjective component, or ‘value-ladenness’, in the
data, models, theories, apparatus, routines, dis-
ciplines, etc. By adopting a perspective from
which all scientific results are regarded as histo-
rical constructs, it is possible to expose the va-
lue-ladenness of  scientific communities. A meta-
analysis of ‘Climategate’ from such a perspecti-
ve provides a deeper understanding of how sci-
entists collectively prepare themselves to parti-
cipate in a thorny controversy. Those scientists
can be seen to devote considerable attention to
methodology, by the way.38
I would like to propose a fifth role for sci-
entists. It can be seen as an extension of  the role
of ‘honest broker of policy alternatives’ but has
a somewhat broader scope. This role entails re-
vealing and explaining precisely what the scienti-
fic field is doing. It entails providing transparen-
cy with regard to the questions raised, and it en-
tails reflection on the science system itself. I the-
refore term this role the ‘reflector’. The reflector
will reflect upon how research themes are defi-
ned; he will reveal and explain the underlying
value patterns. The reflector attempts to stand
above the process of interaction between the
physical world and policy. He is not concerned
with the possible answers to policy questions.
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Rather, he is interested in whether the right ques-
tions have been asked, and what must be done if
there are several, potentially conflicting, interes-
ts at stake. In a complex society, how can one do
justice to the interests of  the people of  today,
while also taking seriously the scientific ‘worse
case analyses’ which relate to the effects on futu-
re generations?
Lastly, I wish to call for greater interaction
between those people who hold very different vi-
sions, whether of climate change or of science
itself. The concept and tools of  ‘post-normal sci-
ence’ - an interactive method of providing deci-
sion-makers with scientific information which has
been reviewed by a more extended community
of peers - would seem to offer very promising
opportunities in this regard.39
To arrive at a complete list of  ten guiding
principles, I will add four more, which I base on
my earlier research:
7. Take ‘normal science’ seriously, but also
organize reflection on its uncertainties and
value-ladenness.
8. Alongside the statistical reliability of results
(expressed in terms of  probability), devote
due attention to their methodological reliability
(expressed in terms of  strengths and weak-
nesses) and their public reliability (expressed
as the degree of public confidence in the sci-
entists who produce them).
9. Involve a larger group of specialists and
non-specialists who hold different values in
monitoring the quality of scientific assess-
ments.
10. Be wary of accepting the conclusions
of actors and practitioners at face value: try
to delve deeper through the layers of com-
plexity by means of  narrative methods.
In the years ahead, I also expect to conduct
further research in this methodological area, spe-
cifically, the methodology of  organizing interac-
tion between science and policy.
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Endnotes
1 A famous book by the social psychologists Festinger, Rie-
cken & Schachter (1956, revised 1964) tells of the American
UFO cult, which predicted a flood which would destroy the
entire world. Their timing was precise: the event would take
place just before dawn on 21 December 1954.
2 It was my publisher Freek van der Steen (a theologian) who
drew my attention to this distinction.
3 Based on his own presentation of a large body of statistics,
Lomborg concludes that there are more reasons for opti-
mism than for pessimism. Many ecologists have responded
angrily to Lomborg’s publication, accusing him of  a lack of
scientific integrity. An official commission reached much the
same conclusion but its ruling was quashed by the Danish
government due to procedural mistakes. Closer examinati-
on of  Lomborg’s chapter on climate change reveals that he
does indeed present the main conclusions of the IPCC re-
ports accurately, but also criticizes those findings in a so-
mewhat dismissive and optimistic manner. I do not believe
that it is just to accuse Lomborg of any impropriety based
on the content of this chapter, although it is necessary to
take his remarks with more than a pinch of salt. But this
applies equally to some - but not all, or even most - of the
statements made by the environmental activists.
4 Cf. van de Klundert (2008), p. 3.
5 This historical outline is taken from Pieterman (2008).
6 Cf. Beck (1992).
7 IPCC (2007), p. 5.
8 IPCC (2007), p. 9. In making this statement, the IPCC au-
thors have made allowance for the methodological problem
that some trees, particularly in the northern latitudes and
mountainous regions, have adapted over the course of the
decades and are no longer so sensitive to changes in tempe-
rature. Accordingly, temperature reconstructions based on
the ‘proxy calibration’ method based on tree-ring data will
not reveal any significant rise in temperature since the mid-
20th century, although we can be reasonably certain that such
a rise has indeed occurred. This discrepancy is termed the
‘divergence problem’ and is examined in the scientific litera-
ture. In my opinion, the analysis of this methodological
problem and the possible impact on reconstructions of tem-
peratures several centuries in the past should be given grea-
ter attention by the scientific community than is currently
the case. (See also Visser et al. 2010).
9 IPCC (2007), p. 7.
10 IPCC (2007), p. 8.
11 IPCC (2007), p. 10. Petersen (2006, 2011) offers a thorough
analysis of how the IPCC arrives at  such assessments.
12 IPCC (2007), p. 7.
13 The PBL (2010) has demonstrated that the summaries of
the 2007 report are subject to a high degree of selectivity
with regard to the focus on the main negative effects of
climate change. This is due to the adoption of a ‘risk-orien-
ted’ approach, an approach which has itself not been ade-
quately defined or explained in the report.
14The UNESCO World Commission on the Ethics of  Scien-
tific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) offers the fo-
llowing working definition of the precautionary principle:
“When human activities may lead to morally unacceptable
harm that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions
shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm. Morally unac-
ceptable harm refers to harm to humans or the environment
that is:
 -threatening to human life or health, or
 -serious and effectively irreversible, or
 -inequitable to present or future generations, or
 -imposed without adequate consideration of the human ri-
ghts of those affected.
 The judgement of plausibility should be grounded on scien-
tific analysis. Analysis should be ongoing so that chosen
actions are subject to review. Uncertainty may apply to, but
need not be limited to, causality or the bounds of  the pos-
sible harm. Actions are interventions that are undertaken
before harm occurs that seek to avoid or diminish the harm.
Actions should be chosen that are proportional to the se-
riousness of the potential harm, with consideration of their
positive and negative consequences, and with an assessment
of the moral implications of both action and inaction. The
choice of action should be the result of a participatory pro-
cess.” The Precautionary Principle, p. 13; UNESCO/CO-
MEST (2005), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/
001395/139578e.pdf, retrieved 9 Sept 2011.
15 Lomborg (2004).
16As Lionel Robbins, one of  the founders of  the theory,
wrote: “Economics is the science which studies human beha-
viour as a relationship between ends and scarce means whi-
ch have alternative uses” (1935).
17Societal preferences which relate to the distribution of weal-
th can be interpreted as part of the formal concept of welfa-
re. Similarly, the wish to ensure continuity of  ecological,
economic and social qualities can be regarded as a primary
social requirement (whereby such continuity becomes a com-
ponent of the quality of life). See: den Butter & Dietz (2004)
and de Vries & Petersen (2009).
18 With thanks to Ruth Giesen, a philosophy student at the
University of Groningen who completed  her internship
with the PBL in 2007/2008.
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19 van Asselt et al. (2010, pp. 119-133) offers an account of
how futurologists can address discontinuities and surpri-
ses.
20Frans Brom (2011) raises an interesting question: why is the
initial reaction to the risks of geo- engineering so often one
of caution? Insofar as geo-engineering seeks to restore a
situation which has been disrupted or disturbed (the global
temperature), it is indeed a form of environmental protecti-
on (which includes an element of precautionary action).
However, it will not be effective if implemented too cau-
tiously. Brom contends that the notion of  precaution is
based on ‘an implicit idea of ecological values which have
not yet been spoilt, or an environment which has not yet
been damaged’ (p. 13).
21 Victor (2011).
22 E.g. agreements covering such aspects as efficiency, techno-
logy and emissions trading systems.
23 Rayner & Malone (1998).
24 See www.klimaatmatrix.nl. I represented climate science in
this project. The other ‘intendants’ were Albert Cath (social
sciences), Bram van de Klundert (spatial planning) and San-
der de Bruyn (economics). Some parts of this address are
taken from my Matrix essay (Petersen 2010).
25 De burger is aan zet na Kopenhagen, De Volkskrant, 22 Decem-
ber 2009, p. 11.
26 Trouw, 23 February 2010, p. 28.
27 Trouw, 3 November 2009, p. 28.
28 See www.klimaatmatrix.nl.
29 Hajer (2011).
30 Also acknowledged by Victor (2011).
31 The discussion of ‘ambiguity’ is based on Byers (2011).
32 Byers (2011).
33 Morin (2008).
34 Gross (2010).
35 Sen (2009), p. ix.
36 Morin & Kern (1999).
37 Latour & Woolgar (1979).
38 Ryghaug & Skjolsvold (2010).
39 See Funtowicz & Ravetz (1993), Van der Sluijs et al. (2008)
and Petersen et al. (2011).
